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Abstract 
In fiscal year 2014, the U.S. federal government obligated over $443 billion in contracts. 
Within the Department of Defense (DoD), over $283 billion were obligated in the execution of 
1.3 million contract actions (USA Spending, 2015). Despite the critical importance of the 
DoD’s contract management function, both the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and 
the DoD Inspector General (DoD IG) have reported problems in achieving successful 
procurement outcomes. The lack of trained personnel, capable processes, and effective 
internal controls result in the DoD having a higher level of vulnerability for procurement fraud 
(Rendon & Rendon, in press). Contracting officers, because of their pivotal position in the 
procurement process and their interface with both government officials and industry, are in a 
unique position to be on the front line for deterring and identifying procurement fraud. 
However, in order to be effective procurement fraud fighters, contracting officers must be 
knowledgeable of both contracting processes and internal controls. The purpose of this 
research was to assess DoD contracting officers’ knowledge of the DoD’s contract 
management processes and related internal controls. Our research findings indicated 
contracting officers may have a possible knowledge deficiency in the areas of procurement 
internal controls and procurement fraud schemes. Based on the implications of these 
findings, recommendations are made to the assessed agency and the DoD. 
Background 
In fiscal year 2014, the U.S. federal government obligated over $443 billion in 
contracts. Within the Department of Defense (DoD), over $283 billion were obligated in the 
execution of 1.3 million contract actions (USA Spending, 2015). These contract actions were 
for the procurement of weapon systems, supplies, and services. Despite the critical 
importance of the DoD’s contract management function, both the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) and the DoD Inspector General (DoDIG) have reported problems in achieving 
successful procurement outcomes. The GAO has identified the lack of trained contracting 
personnel and the use of ill-suited contracting arrangements as some of the problems in 
DoD contract management (GAO, 2013). The DoD IG has identified numerous deficiencies 
in contract management processes as well as weakness in contract management internal 
controls (DoD, 2009, 2014). The lack of trained personnel, capable processes, and effective 
internal controls result in the DoD having a higher level of vulnerability for procurement fraud 
(Rendon & Rendon, in press). Past incidents of procurement fraud can be traced to 
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incompetent personnel, incapable contracting processes, or ineffective internal controls 
(Tan, 2013). Contracting officers, because of their pivotal position in the procurement 
process and their interface with both government officials and industry, are in a unique 
position to be on the front line for deterring and identifying procurement fraud. However, in 
order to be effective procurement fraud fighters, contracting officers must be knowledgeable 
of both contracting processes and internal controls. 
The purpose of this research was to assess DoD contracting officers’ knowledge of 
the DoD’s contract management processes and related internal controls. Specifically, we 
focus on the following research questions: 
1. What is the contracting workforce’s knowledge level of procurement fraud 
schemes as related to contract management processes, internal control 
components, and procurement fraud scheme categories? 
2. What is the contracting workforce’s perception of procurement fraud as 
related to the contract management processes, internal control components, 
and procurement fraud scheme categories? 
Literature Review 
This section provides a brief literature review that serves as a foundation for our 
empirical study. We review academic journal articles, government reports, and previous 
research studies in the areas of auditability, contract management processes, and internal 
control components.  
Auditability in Public Organizations 
The literature on auditability reflects an organization’s transformation in its 
governance and knowledge management capabilities. Power (2007) states, “Auditability is a 
condition of possibility of all inspection and auditing practices and also a mode of 
organizational transformation” (p. 14). This organizational transformation occurs when data 
collection practices and documentation systems are established, thus allowing organizations 
to be audited. This is distinct from organizations conducting actual audits or inspections. 
Audibility requires organizations to establish and actively manage an institutionally 
acceptable knowledge management system supporting its governance of processes and 
practices (Power, 1996). Organizations’ increased concern for risk management has 
resulted in an accompanying emphasis on auditability of internal controls (Power, 2007).  
Auditability is also reflected in an organization’s governance structure for the 
management of procurement activities. The literature includes research supporting the 
importance of competent personnel (in terms of education, training, and experience) and 
competent organizations (in terms of capable processes) for ensuring the success of 
procurement projects (Frame, 1999) and the need for a renewed emphasis on strong 
internal controls as a response to the increase in procurement fraud incidents (Rollins & 
Lanza, 2005). Finally, the literature also includes past research supporting governance 
structures in public sector agencies and the role procurement projects play in ensuring 
accountability, transparency, compliance, and consistency in delivery, value for money, and 
stakeholder engagement (Crawford & Helm, 2009).  
Contract Management Processes 
A common focus of theoretical research on contract management is the use of an 
agency theory lens (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agency theory, specifically the buyer–seller 
problem, is used to analyze the process of structuring contract agreements between the 
buyer (principal) and the seller (agent) for the performance of a service or the delivery of a 
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product (Eisenhardt, 1989). Because of conflicting goals and asymmetrical information 
between the buyer and the seller, as well as the opportunistic behavior of both parties, 
contracts are used to govern the buyer and seller relationship. Structuring contracts using 
product, exchange, and governance rules allows both parties to align contract goals at the 
lowest cost. Product rules are used to establish product specifications or service 
requirements, and exchange rules specify the parties’ rights and obligations, as well as 
contract period of performance, delivery schedule, and method of contractor payment. 
Governance rules are used to reward and sanction cooperative or defective behavior of both 
parties through the use of performance incentive or penalty clauses (Brown, Potoski, & Van 
Slyke, 2013). 
The structuring of contracts follows the generally-accepted contract management 
phases of procurement planning, solicitation planning, solicitation, source selection, contract 
administration, and contract closeout (Rendon & Snider, 2008).  
Procurement planning involves the process of identifying which business needs can 
be best met by procuring products or services outside the organization. This process 
involves determining whether to procure, how to procure, what to procure, how much to 
procure, and when to procure. The solicitation planning process involves preparing the 
documents needed to support the solicitation. This process involves documenting program 
requirements and identifying potential sources. Solicitation is the process of obtaining 
information (proposals) from the sellers on how project needs can be met. The source 
selection process includes evaluating proposals and conducting contract negotiations with 
the seller in an attempt to come to agreement on all aspects of the contract—including cost, 
schedule, performance, terms and conditions, and anything else related to the contracted 
effort. Contract administration is the process of ensuring that each party’s performance 
meets the contractual requirements. The activities involved in contract administration will 
depend on the contract statement of work, contract type, and contract performance period. 
Contract closeout/termination is the process of verifying that all administrative matters are 
concluded on a contract that is otherwise physically complete. A government contract can 
end in one of three ways. First, the contract can be successfully completed, allowed to run 
its full period of performance, and then closed out. Second, the contract can be terminated 
for the convenience of the government. Finally, the contract can be terminated for default. 
Regardless of how the contract ends, all contracts must be closed out. 
These contract management processes will only be as capable and effective as the 
internal controls used by the acquisition agency to manage and oversee those processes. 
The next section provides an overview of internal controls as applied to acquisition 
agencies. 
Internal Controls 
As discussed previously, having capable contracting management processes helps 
organizations become auditable. In addition to capable contracting processes, effective 
internal controls are important in order for organizations to become auditable. 
In 1992, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO), composed of the 
AICPA, IIA, FEI, and the AAA, established the Internal Control Integrated Framework, which 
includes five internal control components (COSO, 2013). In May 2013, COSO (2013) 
updated its internal control integrated framework, which now includes 17 principles within 
the five components of internal control. In September 2014, the GAO (2014) updated its 
Standards for Internal Control for the Federal Government (Green Book). The five 
components of the framework are discussed in the following sections (COSO, 2013). 
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Control Environment  
The control environment component of the framework entails the tone at the top. 
Management’s integrity and ethical behavior sets the tone for the organization (COSO, 
2013). A weak control environment can open the door to fraud, waste, and abuse (GAO, 
2006). The effects of waste and abuse can be just as damaging as fraud to any organization 
in terms of loss of dollars, time, and personnel. In the case of government organizations, 
public trust could be compromised and public funds could be lost when the control 
environment is weak. 
Risk Assessment 
The risk assessment component of the framework calls for management to discuss 
what could go wrong within the organization and how to best mitigate any potential risks, 
including fraud risks (COSO, 2013).  
Control Activities 
The control activities component of the framework encompasses all of the control 
procedures that have been determined to be needed to make sure that the organization 
meets its goals and objectives (COSO, 2013). One example of a control activity is 
segregation of duties or separation of duties. No one person should be in charge of all the 
procedures within a process. This could lead to opportunities for unscrupulous people to 
commit fraud. 
Information and Communication 
The information and communication component of the framework includes the 
accounting system and the methods of internal and external communications within an 
organization (COSO, 2013).  
Monitoring Activities 
The monitoring activities component of the framework helps ensure that the controls 
in place are being followed and are meeting the organizational goals set by management 
(COSO, 2013). If any controls need to be updated, changed, removed, or added, 
management can determine the best way to proceed. Monitoring activities is important to 
help ensure a continuous process of planning, implementing, reviewing, and adjusting 
controls. 
The previously discussed internal control components are integral to ensuring 
auditability in the acquisition agency’s procurement and contracting processes. Any material 
weaknesses in the agency’s internal control components can increase its vulnerability to 
procurement fraud. Although there are many different types of procurement fraud incidents, 
the majority of procurement fraud can be categorized in the following procurement fraud 
schemes. 
Procurement Fraud Scheme Categories 
Reducing contract fraud, waste, and abuse should be the goal of any government 
organization, especially the DoD (GAO, 2006). Ineffective internal controls leave 
government organizations vulnerable to contract fraud, waste, and abuse, as shown in the 
many incidents of procurement fraudulent activity within the DoD and the federal 
government (Tan, 2013). While there are numerous kinds of procurement fraud, they can be 
classified into six categories, which include collusion, bid rigging, conflict of interest, and 
billing/cost/pricing schemes, fraudulent purchases, and fraudulent representation. These 
fraud scheme categories are discussed next. 
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Collusion 
Specific types of fraud schemes included within the collusion category of fraud 
schemes are kickbacks, bribery, and deliberate split purchases. Kickbacks involve 
government officials receiving something of value such as money from a contractor for 
personal gain in exchange for providing a favor such as submitting false invoices. Bribery 
involves influencing someone’s judgment in order to obtain favor, such as bribing a 
contracting officer in order to be awarded additional contracts. Split purchases are often 
seen in the government purchase card program where purchases that generally would not 
meet the micro-purchase threshold of $3,000 are deliberately split into two or more 
purchase transactions to circumvent the contracting rules and regulations.  
Bid Rigging 
Bid rigging involves exploitation of the bidding process by falsifying information such 
as price competition, agency needs, and contract specifications with the intent to circumvent 
the standard bidding process. Government bid specifications purposely leaked to favored 
offerors feeds the bid rigging fraud scheme and creates an unfair advantage to others 
seeking government contracts (Wells, 2008).  
Conflict of Interest 
Conflicts of interest create problems for government officials who are in a position to 
make decisions that could be seen as not being in the best interest of the government. For 
example, a contracting officer who is reviewing a contract bid from a company in which he or 
she owns stock would be construed as a major conflict of interest. 
Billing/Cost/Pricing Schemes 
Billing, cost, or pricing type fraud schemes involve a misrepresentation of financial 
information as well as intentionally mischarging. For example, government losses are 
sometimes due to a contract’s labor cost mischarging, such as padding employee timecards 
and charging the government for the extra hours that were not worked by employees. 
Defective pricing, change order abuse, and comingling of contracts are also examples of 
cost and pricing schemes. 
Fraudulent Purchases 
Fraudulent purchases involve purchases made which are beyond the government 
requirements with the intent to defraud the government. An example of fraudulent purchases 
is when a purchase cardholder purchases electronic equipment for personal use or with the 
intent to sell the equipment on e-bay for personal gain.  
Fraudulent Representation 
Fraudulent representation involves falsely and intentionally misrepresenting goods 
and services. Product substitution is an example of fraudulent representation, as it usually 
involves intentionally providing defective or used parts instead of non-defective or new parts 
as required by a contract. The following section discusses the conceptual framework of this 
research. 
Conceptual Framework 
The auditability literature identifies the importance of competent procurement 
personnel, capable contract management processes, and effective procurement internal 
controls. These major facets of auditability are reflected in Figure 1, which presents our 
conceptual framework. 
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(Rendon & Rendon, in press) 
Our conceptual model shows that auditability in procurement agencies requires 
organizations to have competent people, capable processes, and effective internal controls. 
The acquisition workforce needs competent people that are educated, trained, and 
experienced in the complexities of government contracting. Past research has shown that 
many participants in the acquisition of services, especially at the installation/base level, are 
not members of the acquisition workforce. Thus, they may not be receiving the required 
education and training needed to perform their acquisition functions (GAO, 2002, 2011).  
Acquisition organizations also need capable contract management processes. 
Process capability is measured in terms of processes that are fully-established, 
institutionalized, mandated, integrated with other organizational processes, periodically 
measured, and continuously improved. Past research using the Contract Management 
Maturity Model (CMMM) has shown that some acquisition organizations have less-than-
capable contracting processes. These contracting processes lack process strength, 
management support, process measurement, and process improvement (Rendon, 2008, 
2009, 2010, 2011).  
Finally, acquisition organizations also need effective internal controls. Effective 
internal controls refers to the objective of enforcing internal control policies to ensure 
compliance with laws and regulations, monitoring procedures to assess enforcement, and 
reporting material weaknesses. The DoD IG (2009, 2014) reports that many of the 
procurement deficiencies they identified are the result of material internal control 
weaknesses in the procurement processes. Both GAO and DoD IG reports have indicated 
an ever-increasing concern about weak internal controls within the DoD’s acquisition 
agencies. These types of internal control weaknesses increase the government’s risk of 
jeopardizing the value for the public dollars spent on supplies and services (DoD IG, 2009, 
2014).  
The lack of competent personnel, capable processes, and effective internal controls 
may be resulting in incidents of procurement fraud within the DoD and throughout the 
defense supply chain (Tan, 2013). Government contracting officers, because of their pivotal 
position interfacing with industry, should be the first line of defense for identifying 
procurement fraud red flags. However, identifying procurement fraud red flags require 
contracting officers to be knowledgeable of procurement internal controls. Thus, the purpose 
of this research is to assess DoD contracting officers’ knowledge of the DoD’s contract 
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management processes and related internal controls. We conduct our research through the 
use of a web-based assessment tool. Our research methodology is discussed next.  
Research Methodology 
We conducted this research by first developing and testing a web-based assessment 
tool that can be used to assess the contracting officers’ knowledge level of internal controls 
and procurement fraud and to assess their perceptions of procurement fraud within their 
organizations. With the assistance of our MBA student (Chang, 2013), we developed a web-
based assessment tool consisting of 26 knowledge-based questions pertaining to 
contracting processes, internal control components, and procurement fraud schemes. These 
knowledge-based questions were developed using government procurement fraud sources 
such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID, n.d.) and the Office of the 
Inspector General, U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) procurement fraud 
handbook (GSA OIG, 2012). The assessment tool also included 12 organization-based 
items related to the contracting officers’ perceptions of internal controls within their 
organizations. These items were designed to determine if any aspects of the organizations’ 
internal structure, processes, or culture made the organization more susceptible to 
fraudulent activity. These items were also designed to assess the contracting officers’ 
perceptions of their organizations regarding fraud incidents. The organization-based items 
were adopted and modified from the Internal Control Survey developed by the New York 
State Internal Control Association (NYSICA, 2006).  
The survey respondents were contracting officers assigned to the Army Mission 
Installation Contracting Command (MICC). This Army contracting agency is responsible for 
supporting the U.S. Army installations by contracting for office supplies, equipment, support 
services, and minor construction. In 2012, the MICC managed over $6.4 billion in contracts 
using a variety of contract mechanisms, ranging from the government purchase card to 
complex services contracts (Chang, 2013).  
Research Findings 
The assessment tool was deployed in early April 2013 to a total eligible population of 
1350 contract management professionals. The assessment tool was initiated by 146 
respondents, and was completed by 99 respondents, resulting in a response rate of 7% 
(Chang, 2013). 
Analysis of Knowledge Assessment Findings 
The average score on the knowledge portion of the assessment tool was 63% 
correct of the 26 questions. There were minimal differences in average scores between 
civilian and military contract management professionals. However, there were some 
differences in average scores by experience and DAWIA levels. As contracting experience 
and DAWIA level increases, so does the average score on the knowledge assessment. 
Although warranted contracting officers scored higher than non-warranted contracts 
specialists, there is less difference in average scores between non-warranted and warranted 
contract management professionals. 
Each knowledge assessment item was related to contract management processes, 
internal control components, and procurement fraud schemes. Figures 2 through 4 reflect 
the average score based on each of these areas.  
As can be seen in these figures, there is variation in the average knowledge 
assessment score among these three areas. From the perspective of the contract 
management process, assessment knowledge items related to the procurement planning 
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process had the highest average score, compared to items related to contract closeout, 
which had the lowest score. From the perspective of the internal control components, 
assessment knowledge items related to the risk assessment component had the highest 
average score, compared to items related to information and communication, which had the 
lowest score. From the perspective of procurement fraud schemes, assessment knowledge 
items related to bid rigging scheme had the highest average score, compared to items 












Analysis of Organization Perception Findings 
The assessment tool also included items related to perceptions of the organization’s 
vulnerability to procurement fraud and perceptions of the organizations’ internal controls. 
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Three of these questions asked about perceptions of the organizations’ vulnerability to 
procurement fraud in terms of contract management process, internal control component, 
and procurement fraud schemes. Figures 5–7 reflect the responses to these items.  
As can be seen in these figures, when asked which contract management process is 
most vulnerable to fraud in their organization, those surveyed selected the procurement 
planning process the most often (20%) and contract closeout was selected the least often 
(0%). Approximately 11% responded that they did not know, and 34% of the respondents 
stated they did not suspect fraud.  
When asked which internal control component is most vulnerable to fraud in their 
organization, the information and communication component was selected the most often 
(13%) and control environment was selected the least often (4%). Approximately 17% 
responded that they did not know, and 38% of the respondents stated they did not suspect 
fraud. 
When asked to which procurement fraud scheme they perceived their organization 
was most susceptible, those surveyed selected conflict of interest the most often (13%), and 
fraudulent representation was selected the least often (0%). Approximately 13% responded 
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Implications of Findings 
The results of both the knowledge assessment and the organization perception 
assessment have some interesting implications. The average score on the knowledge 
assessment varied by contract management process, internal control component, and 
procurement fraud scheme. The contracting officers’ average score on the knowledge 
assessment (63%) reflects a possible knowledge deficiency in procurement internal controls. 
Using traditional college grading protocol, this score would be converted to a grade of D. 
This finding, along with the average response to the organization perception item, “I have 
adequate knowledge of contracting fraud schemes to perform my duties” (see appendix, 
Item 6) of 3.9, suggests that perhaps the contracting officers are overly optimistic in self-
assessing their knowledge of procurement fraud schemes.  
Additionally, a significant percentage of the respondents indicated that “I do not 
suspect fraud” in relation to the organization’s contracting processes (34%), internal control 
components (38%), and procurement fraud scheme susceptibility (53%). These findings, 
along with the low scoring knowledge assessment, may indicate that although the majority 
of contracting officers do not suspect fraud in their organizations, they also do not have a 
sufficient working knowledge of procurement fraud. The contracting officers’ limited 
knowledge of procurement fraud and their perception that their organization is not 
susceptible to fraud may reveal that the organization could in fact be vulnerable to some 
form of procurement fraud.  
Recommendations 
The results of the knowledge-based assessment indicated that, although the average 
score was 63%, the contracting officers’ knowledge of contracting processes, internal 
controls, and procurement fraud schemes increased as years of experience and DAWIA 
certification level increases. Recent research shows that the DAWIA required courses for 
contracting certification do not include a mandatory fraud training or awareness course 
(Castillo & Flannigan, 2014). Our first recommendation is for the Defense Acquisition 
University (DAU) to incorporate coverage of internal controls and procurement fraud 
schemes in the mandatory contracting curriculum. Our final recommendation is to further 
explore the organization’s information and communication internal control component. This 
was the internal control component with the lowest score on the knowledge assessment, as 
well as the component chosen as most vulnerable to procurement fraud in the organization. 
Perhaps this organization should apply additional emphasis—for example, training and 
visibility—in this internal control component. This may increase the workforce’s knowledge 
level of this aspect of their organization’s internal controls and decrease their perception of 
this area of fraud vulnerability.  
Conclusion 
Auditability theory states that an organization must have competent personnel, 
capable processes, and effective internal controls to ensure proper organizational 
governance. The lack of competent personnel, capable processes, and effective internal 
controls may result in organizations being more vulnerable to fraud. The purpose of this 
research was to assess DoD contracting officers’ knowledge levels of procurement fraud 
schemes as related to contract management processes, internal control components, and 
procurement fraud scheme categories. Our research findings indicated contracting officers 
may have a possible knowledge deficiency in the area of procurement internal controls. 
Additionally, our findings indicate that perhaps contracting officers are overly optimistic in 
self-assessing their knowledge of procurement fraud schemes. Finally, we also conclude 
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that the contracting officers’ limited knowledge of procurement fraud and their perception 
that their organization is not susceptible to fraud may reveal that the organization could in 
fact be vulnerable to some form of procurement fraud.  
Based on these findings, we recommend that the DAU incorporate coverage of 
internal controls and procurement fraud schemes in the mandatory contracting curriculum. 
We also recommend that the assessed organization apply additional emphasis on its 
information and communication internal control component to increase the workforce’s 
knowledge level of this aspect of their organization’s internal controls and decrease their 
perception of this area’s vulnerability to fraud. 
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